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I. INTRODUCTION
Assume, for a moment, that Nebraska enacted a law requiring
state employees, without any exceptions, to work on Saturdays in or-
der to provide better access to government services.  Although the
law’s purpose is entirely secular, a government employee whose relig-
ion dictates a Saturday Sabbath on which she may not work must
choose between violating her religious beliefs and losing her job.
What can she do?
She might think that a constitutional right to free exercise of relig-
ion guarantees her right to abstain from working on the Sabbath.
However, neither the federal nor Nebraska constitutions’ free exercise
provisions provide any remedy because the law is neutral and gener-
ally applicable—it is not directed at religious practices and does not
allow any exceptions—and a court would likely consider it to be ra-
tionally related to a legitimate government purpose.1  Thus, unpro-
tected by either the federal or state constitutions, the government
employee faces a difficult choice.
Though the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the U.S.
Constitution’s First Amendment as requiring only a rational basis test
for neutral, generally applicable laws since it decided Employment Di-
vision, Department of Human Resources v. Smith in 1990,2 only re-
cently was the Nebraska Constitution’s free exercise provision
interpreted in similar fashion.  After the Nebraska Supreme Court’s
holding in In re Interest of Anaya (“Anaya II”) in December of 2008,3
an individual whose religious liberty is burdened by a neutral, gener-
ally applicable law has no recourse under the Nebraska Constitution,
no matter how extreme the burden is.4
The plaintiffs in Anaya II challenged the state’s newborn screening
statutes5 under the free exercise provision of article I, section four of
1. See Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); In re
Interest of Anaya (Anaya II), 276 Neb. 825, 758 N.W.2d 10 (2008).
2. See Smith, 494 U.S. 872; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)
(striking down a federal statute that reestablished the compelling interest test);
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (apply-
ing the rational basis test).
3. Anaya II, 276 Neb. 825, 758 N.W.2d 10.
4. Id.
5. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-519 to -524 (Reissue 2009).
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the Nebraska Constitution (hereinafter “Section Four”),6 claiming
that drawing blood from their infant under the newborn screening
statutes violated their sincerely held religious beliefs.7  In so arguing,
they cited Palmer v. Palmer, in which the Nebraska Supreme Court
held that the compelling interest test applied to Section Four claims.8
The court in Anaya II rejected this argument, holding that Palmer’s
adoption of the compelling interest test depended on a no longer valid
federal law.9  Though the court acknowledged that the state and fed-
eral provisions contained different language, it refused to analyze the
Nebraska provision’s text or history.10  The court then held that Ne-
braska’s Section Four protected free exercise only as much as the Fed-
eral First Amendment because they protected similar rights.11  Since,
under Smith, the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause requires
only a rational basis test for neutral laws of general applicability, the
court reasoned that the Nebraska provision does as well.12
Anaya II will have wide-ranging effects on the status of religious
freedom in Nebraska.  Part II of this Note discusses the development
of federal and Nebraska free exercise jurisprudence, concluding with
the Anaya II decision.  Following this background information, Part
III examines the effects of the Nebraska Supreme Court’s adoption of
the rational basis test for neutral, generally applicable laws that inci-
dentally burden religious practice.  Part IV concludes with the recom-
mendation that the Nebraska Legislature adopt a statute
reestablishing the compelling interest test for all Section Four free ex-
ercise claims.
The Nebraska Supreme Court’s adoption of the rational basis test
in Anaya II was a dangerous mistake.  First, by tying the meaning of
Section Four to the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretations of the First
Amendment, the Nebraska Supreme Court has effectively allowed the
U.S. Supreme Court to amend the Nebraska Constitution without the
consent of Nebraska’s citizens.  This is at odds with both the text and
the history of the Nebraska Constitution.  In addition, the use of the
rational basis test results in a lack of any real protection of religious
6. “No person shall be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship
against his consent, and no preference shall be given by law to any religious soci-
ety, nor shall any interference with the rights of conscience be permitted.” NEB.
CONST. art. I, § 4; Anaya II, 276 Neb. at 832, 758 N.W.2d at 17.
7. Anaya II, 276 Neb. at 829, 758 N.W.2d at 15.
8. Palmer v. Palmer, 249 Neb. 814, 545 N.W.2d 751 (1996), overruled by Anaya II,
276 Neb. 825, 758 N.W.2d 10 (2008).
9. Anaya II, 276 Neb. at 833–34, 758 N.W.2d at 18.  The federal law was the Relig-
ious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, part
of which the U.S. Supreme Court struck down in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997).
10. Anaya II, 276 Neb. at 833–34, 758 N.W.2d at 18.
11. Id. at 834–35, 758 N.W.2d at 19.
12. Id.
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practice—neutral, generally applicable laws can burden religious free-
dom just as much as laws targeted at religion, and religious minori-
ties’ free exercise rights are now subject to the political process.  For
these reasons, the Nebraska Supreme Court’s refusal to apply the
compelling interest test, which it applied in Palmer to Section Four
free exercise claims arising from neutral, generally applicable laws,13
is a mistake that severely limits the protection of religious exercise
under the Nebraska Constitution.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Federal and Nebraska Free Exercise Provisions
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides,
in relevant part, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”14  In
contrast, article I, section four of the Nebraska Constitution states: “
No person shall be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship
against his consent, and no preference shall be given by law to any religious
society, nor shall any interference with the rights of conscience be
permitted.15
Judicial interpretations of these two provisions have changed signifi-
cantly over the past fifty years.
B. The Development of the Compelling Interest Test
1. The United States Supreme Court: Sherbert and Yoder
The United States Supreme Court began its thirty-seven year use
of the compelling interest test for First Amendment free exercise
claims in Sherbert v. Verner.16  South Carolina’s unemployment bene-
fits office denied unemployment benefits to the plaintiff in Sherbert
because she refused to accept a position that required her to work on
Saturdays, which Seventh Day Adventists recognize as the Sabbath.17
The Court found that, by forcing the plaintiff to choose between her
religious beliefs and obtaining unemployment benefits, the state bur-
dened her religious exercise in the same way as if it had fined her for
her Saturday worship.18  The Court announced that even incidental
burdens on an individual’s religious exercise must be justified by a
compelling governmental interest.19
13. Palmer, 249 Neb. at 818, 545 N.W.2d at 755, overruled by Anaya II, 276 Neb. 825,
758 N.W.2d 10 (2008).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4.
16. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
17. Id. at 399–400.
18. Id. at 404.
19. Id. at 403; see also id. at 406 (“[N]o showing merely of a rational relationship to
some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional
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The Court again addressed free exercise in Wisconsin v. Yoder.20  A
Wisconsin law required all children under sixteen years old, with lim-
ited exceptions, to attend school.21  The plaintiffs in Yoder were under
sixteen, but their parents had stopped sending them to school because
formal education beyond eighth grade conflicted with their religious
beliefs.22  The parents instead wished to informally educate their chil-
dren in values and skills central to the Amish way of life.23  As in
Sherbert, the Court stated that a law may only interfere with a genu-
ine religious practice if it serves a compelling state interest.24  It noted
that even a facially neutral law, such as the compulsory school attend-
ance law, may violate the First Amendment if it “unduly burdens” re-
ligious exercise.25  The Court ultimately concluded that the
government had not shown a sufficiently compelling interest to justify
burdening the plaintiffs’ religious freedom.26
2. The Nebraska Supreme Court: LeDoux
The Nebraska Supreme Court first applied the compelling interest
test to a federal First Amendment claim in LeDoux v. LeDoux.27 Le-
Doux concerned a divorce decree that ordered a Jehovah’s Witness
convert not to expose his son to religious beliefs and practices at odds
with Catholicism.28  The restrictions were based on testimony that the
father’s expressions of his newfound religious belief caused his son a
great deal of stress.29  On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court cited
to Sherbert and later cases to support its conclusion that the First
Amendment only allowed a state to burden religious practices through
a regulation that is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling govern-
mental interest.30  The court concluded that, given the boy’s stress,
the restriction was narrowly tailored to advance the state’s compelling
interest in protecting children.31
area, ‘[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion
for permissible limitation.’” (citation omitted)).  Ultimately, the Court found in
Sherbert that the state had not shown any such compelling interest to justify the
burden. Id. at 406–09.
20. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
21. WIS. STAT. § 118.15 (1969); Yoder, 406 U.S at 207, n.2.
22. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207–10.
23. Id. at 210–11.
24. Id. at 214.
25. Id. at 220.
26. Id. at 230.
27. 234 Neb. 479, 452 N.W.2d 1 (1990).
28. Id. at 480–81, 452 N.W.2d at 2.
29. Id. at 484, 452 N.W.2d at 4.
30. Id. at 485–86, 452 N.W.2d at 5.
31. Id. at 486–87, 452 N.W.2d at 5.
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C. Federal Departure from Free Exercise Precedent
Soon after the LeDoux decision, the U.S. Supreme Court changed
its interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.  In Employment Divi-
sion, Department of Human Resources v. Smith the Court abandoned
its longstanding use of the compelling interest test for neutral laws of
general applicability that burden religion.32  The plaintiffs in Smith
ingested peyote as part of a Native American sacrament.33  As a re-
sult, they were fired from their jobs at a drug rehabilitation center.34
When they applied for unemployment benefits, the Oregon Unemploy-
ment Division denied them compensation because they had been fired
for “misconduct.”35  On appeal, Justice Scalia led a majority of the
U.S. Supreme Court in holding, in what many commentators consider
a clear departure from precedent,36 that under the First Amendment,
a neutral, generally applicable law that only incidentally burdens re-
ligious exercise must pass only the rational basis test.37  The majority
asserted that the compelling interest test had only ever applied to (1)
attempts to regulate belief as such;38 (2) “hybrid” cases that combined
violations of other constitutionally protected rights, such as parents’
rights to control their children’s educations;39 (3) unemployment com-
pensation cases;40 and (4) laws that were not neutral or generally
applicable.41
The majority feared that applying the compelling interest test to
neutral, generally applicable laws would allow each individual to be-
come “a law unto himself.”42  The majority distinguished this result
from the compelling interest test’s effect on racial discrimination.43  It
stated that the compelling interest test, when applied to racial dis-
crimination, produced equality of treatment, a “constitutional norm;”
32. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
33. Id. at 874.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See generally, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Beyond RFRA: Free Exercise of Religion
Comes of Age in the State Courts, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 235 (1998); Douglas
Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1990); Ira C.
Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith and the Decline of Supreme Court-Centr-
ism, 1993 BYU L. Rev. 259 (1993); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revision-
ism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990).
37. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
38. Id. at 877.  An example of this would be a law that forbids holding a belief, as
opposed to forbidding a religious practice based on that belief.
39. Id. at 881–82; see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 US. 205 (1972).
40. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882–84; see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
41. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.  For discussion of the meaning of “neutral” and “generally
applicable,” see infra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
42. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167
(1878)).
43. Id. at 885–86.
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but if applied to Smith, the compelling interest test would create the
“constitutional anomaly” of a “private right to ignore generally appli-
cable laws.”44 It also rejected the idea that a court could stem the
flood of potential litigation by protecting only “central” religious prac-
tices.45  The majority noted the impossibility of determining the cen-
trality of a particular practice to an individual’s faith, comparing it to
an unacceptable judicial comparison of the merits of different religious
claims.46
The Court reaffirmed the Smith test and further explained the
meaning of “neutral” and “generally applicable” in Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah.47 Lukumi concerned ordi-
nances that a city council passed in reaction to the proposed construc-
tion of a Santeria church in which members would conduct animal
sacrifices.48  The ordinances were structured so as to prohibit ritual
sacrifice but to allow almost all other forms of animal slaughter.49
The Court explained that a law is not neutral if it restricts a practice
simply because it is religiously motivated.50  In addition, a regulation
is not generally applicable if the government burdens religiously moti-
vated conduct but not secular conduct that endangers the same gov-
ernmental interest as much or more than the religious conduct.51  The
anti-animal sacrifice ordinances in Lukumi were not neutral because
their purpose was to suppress a Santeria religious practice, as evi-
denced by the use of the words “sacrifice” and “ritual” in the ordi-
44. Id.
45. Id. at 886–87.  This, however, is a straw man argument.  The centrality of a par-
ticular religious practice to the religion as a whole has never been a part of the
U.S. Supreme Court’s compelling interest test for free exercise. See, e.g., Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).  The
majority cites to Justice Brennan’s dissent in Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Pro-
tective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 473–74 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting), as an exam-
ple of such a centrality requirement. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886.  However, the
majority in Lyng explicitly rejected the use of a centrality requirement. Lyng,
485 U.S. at 457–58.
46. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886–87.
47. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
48. Id. at 525–26.  Before enacting the ordinances at issue, the City Council passed a
resolution declaring that “[t]he City reiterates its commitment to a prohibition
against any and all acts of any and all religious groups which are inconsistent
with public morals, peace or safety.” Id. at 526.
49. Id. at 534–36.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 542–43.  A law that is not neutral is also not generally applicable.  How-
ever, a law can be neutral but not generally applicable.  This happens if a law is
not designed to burden religious practice, but it nonetheless burdens religious
practice without also curtailing secularly motivated conduct that endangers the
same governmental interest.  For example, a law that mandates that government
employees must work on Saturdays and allows an exemption for parents of young
children, but does not provide the same exemption for Saturday Sabbath observ-
ers, would not be generally applicable.
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nance’s language.52  In addition, the Court found that the ordinances
were not generally applicable because they did not prohibit secular
conduct that endangered the government’s interests in protecting pub-
lic health and preventing animal cruelty to an equal or greater extent
than Santeria sacrifice.53  Therefore, the ordinances could only stand
if they were narrowly tailored to further a compelling government in-
terest.  Ultimately, the Court struck down the ordinances because
they were neither neutral nor generally applicable, and they were not
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.54
D. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
In reaction to the tremendous unpopularity of Smith and Lukumi,
Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(“RFRA”).55  RFRA provided that the federal government could not
substantially burden a person’s religious exercise, even through a gen-
erally applicable law, unless it was the least restrictive means of fur-
thering a compelling government interest.56  In other words, RFRA
sought to restore the compelling interest test from Yoder and Sherbert
to all federal free exercise cases.57
E. Interpreting Nebraska’s Free Exercise Provision: Palmer
The Nebraska Supreme Court first interpreted Section Four in
Palmer v. Palmer.58 Palmer concerned the constitutionality of restric-
tions in a custody order on a mother’s ability to include her child in
her religious activities.59  Citing to LeDoux—which the court noted
was based on Sherbert—and the federal RFRA, the court applied the
compelling interest test.60  Without separate analyses, the court held
that the custody order restrictions violated the free exercise provisions
52. Id. at 542.
53. Id. at 543, 545–46.
54. Id. at 538–40, 543–46.
55. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488,
invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  As one commentator
notes, “Smith produced widespread disbelief and outrage.”  Laycock, supra note
36, at 1.  Following the Court’s invalidation of the federal RFRA as it applied to
the states, several state legislatures passed their own state versions of RFRA.
See infra note 67.  In this Note, however, the acronym “RFRA” means the federal
RFRA unless otherwise indicated.
56. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488,
invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
57. The U.S. Supreme Court later found RFRA unconstitutional in City of Boerne v.
Flores because it exceeded Congress’ Fourteenth Amendment powers.  521 U.S.
507 (1997).  For more discussion of City of Boerne, see infra section II.F.
58. 249 Neb. 814, 545 N.W.2d 751 (1996), overruled by In re Interest of Anaya (Anaya
II), 276 Neb. 825, 758 N.W.2d 10 (2008).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 818, 545 N.W.2d at 755.
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in both the U.S. Constitution and the Nebraska Constitution because
the State had not shown that the restrictions furthered its compelling
interest in the child’s well-being.61  The fact that the court provided no
separate analysis of the Nebraska provision and concluded that the
restrictions violated both the federal and state constitutions indicates
that the court intended to establish the compelling interest test as the
standard for Nebraska’s free exercise provision.62  This conclusion is
further supported by the fact that RFRA only applied to First Amend-
ment claims.  State courts could still interpret their state constitu-
tions as providing less protection than the Federal Constitution.63
Less-protective state free exercise provisions simply became irrele-
vant because a plaintiff could lose on the state claim and still win on
the First Amendment claim.64  Therefore, in Palmer, the court was
free to interpret Nebraska’s standard in any way it wished.  The fact
that the court nonetheless adopted the compelling interest test indi-
cates that Section Four independently requires it.
F. The End of the Compelling Interest Test for First
Amendment Free Exercise
The United States Supreme Court struck down RFRA in City of
Boerne v. Flores65 because it found that it was not a proper exercise of
Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment power to pass legislation ensuring
due process and equal protection of the laws.66  Because principles of
federalism, as embodied in the Tenth Amendment, reserve to the
states those powers not constitutionally granted to the federal govern-
ment, the Court held that Congress exceeded its constitutional power
in passing RFRA.67
61. Id. at 820, 545 N.W.2d at 756.
62. Jeremy Patrick, The Religion Provisions of the Nebraska Constitution: An Analy-
sis and Litigation History, 19 J.L. & RELIGION 331, 374 (2003–04).  Indeed, the
court noted in Anaya II that Palmer correctly stated that the compelling interest
standard applied to Section Four claims at that time. In re Interest of Anaya
(Anaya II), 276 Neb. 825, 833, 758 N.W.2d 10, 18 (2008).  For more discussion of
the evidence that the Nebraska Supreme Court intended to break with federal
free exercise jurisprudence and establish an independent, compelling interest
standard for Nebraska’s Section Four, see infra section III.B.
63. Neil McCabe, The State and Federal Religion Clauses: Differences of Degree and
Kind, 5 ST. THOMAS. L. REV. 49, 50, 62 (1993).
64. Id. at 62–64.
65. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
66. Id.  RFRA remains a valid constraint on federal action. See Gonzales v. O Centro
Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (affirming the grant-
ing of a preliminary injunction against a federal government action based on
RFRA).
67. After the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the federal RFRA in City of Boerne, a
number of states passed their own statutes and constitutional amendments
(“state RFRAs”) that reestablished the compelling interest test for governmental
burdens on free exercise, even when that burden came from the application of
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The Nebraska Supreme Court then followed Smith and Lukumi in
Douglas County v. Anaya (“Anaya I”), in which it applied the rational
basis test to a First Amendment claim arising from a neutral, gener-
ally applicable law.68  In this case, Josue and Mary Anaya objected to
the infant metabolic disease testing required by state statute because
it conflicted with their religious beliefs.69  In addition to holding that
the rational basis standard applies to federal free exercise claims
based on neutral laws of general applicability, the court rejected the
plaintiffs’ assertion that a hybrid rights claim (free exercise and pa-
rental rights) entitled them to a compelling interest review.70  The
court finally held that the statute did not violate the plaintiffs’ federal
free exercise rights because it was neutral and generally applicable
and because the state has a rational interest in children’s health and
well-being.71
G. In re Interest of Anaya (Anaya II)
1. Facts and Procedural History
When the Anayas had another child, Joel, in 2007, they also re-
fused to have him tested for metabolic diseases as required by the
newborn testing statutes.72  The state filed a petition pursuant to sec-
tion 43-247(3)(a) of the Nebraska Revised Statutes in the separate ju-
venile court of Douglas County in which it alleged that Joel did not
neutral, generally applicable laws. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01; CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 52-571b (2009); FLA. STAT. §§ 761.01 to 761.05 (2008); 775 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 35/1 to 35/99 (2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, §§ 251 to 258 (2010); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 42-80.1-1 to 42-80.1-4 (2006). These state RFRAs do not present the con-
stitutional problems of the federal RFRA, and states are free to provide greater
protection for liberties under their own constitutions than is provided under the
U.S. Constitution.  McCabe, supra note 63, at 50, 62.
68. 269 Neb. 552, 557, 561, 694 N.W.2d 601, 605–06, 608 (2005).
69. Id. at 554, 694 N.W.2d at 604 (referring to NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-519 (Reissue
2009)).
70. Id. at 557–58, 694 N.W.2d at 606.  The court reached this conclusion based on
statements in lower federal court decisions, despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s
statement to the contrary in Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990).  The federal court language quoted in Anaya I suggests
that it is illogical to allow a plaintiff to burden the government with the compel-
ling interest test by combining two individually insufficient constitutional claims.
See Anaya I, 269 Neb. at 557–58, 694 N.W.2d at 606.
71. Anaya I, 269 Neb. at 560–61, 694 N.W.2d at 608.  The court held that the statute
was neutral because it was not enacted with the purpose of interfering with relig-
ious practice or belief. Id. at 560, 694 N.W.2d at 608.  Further, the court found it
to be generally applicable because it applied to all babies born in the state and
did not have a system of particularized exemptions from testing. Id.
72. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-519 to -524 (Reissue 2009); In re Interest of Anaya (Anaya
II), 276 Neb. 825, 828, 758 N.W.2d 10, 15 (2008).
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have proper parental care because of his parents’ faults or habits.73
Upon the state’s motion, the separate juvenile court of Douglas
County ordered Joel to be placed in the custody of the Department of
Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) until the test results were
known.74  After the test came back negative, the state returned Joel to
his parents and moved to dismiss the case.75  Following the court’s
dismissal of the case, the Anayas appealed.76
2. Holding and Rationale
The most important effect of Anaya II is that the court adopted the
Smith rational basis test for Section Four free exercise claims arising
from neutral, generally applicable laws.77  In doing so, the court an-
nounced that its adoption of the compelling interest test for Section
Four claims in Palmer was no longer binding precedent.78  The court
stated that Palmer no longer applied because it depended entirely on
RFRA, which the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated in City of Boerne.79
It then adopted the Smith rational basis test for Section Four free ex-
ercise claims.80  Though the court acknowledged that Section Four’s
language differed from the federal provision, it refused to “accord
these textual differences weight in terms of their constitutional signif-
icance.”81  It stated that Section Four should be interpreted in the
same way as the First Amendment because each protects similar
rights.82
73. Anaya II, 276 Neb. at 828–29, 758 N.W.2d at 15.  Section 71-524 provides the
procedure for enforcing the newborn screening laws.  The normal procedure is to
bring a civil action in district court, but it allows for other remedies “available by
law.” NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-524 (Reissue 2009).
74. Anaya II, 276 Neb. at 829–30, 758 N.W.2d at 16.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 833–35, 758 N.W.2d at 18–19.  The court first held that it would hear the
case based on the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine, even though
there was no longer any active case or controversy. Id. at 832, 758 N.W.2d at 17.
The court also discussed the proper procedure for enforcing the newborn
screening laws.  In Anaya II, the state obtained custody of Joel through the neg-
lect provision of the juvenile code, section 43-247(3)(a).  276 Neb. at 828–29, 758
N.W.2d at 15.  The court held that although section 43-247 is a proper method of
enforcing the screening statutes in some cases, it was not proper in this case
because the state did not present any proof that the Anayas had neglected Joel.
Id. at 838, 758 N.W.2d at 21.  Therefore, the court concluded that the juvenile
court had never acquired jurisdiction over Joel.  However, these procedural con-
siderations did not affect the court’s free exercise analysis. Id. at 839, 758
N.W.2d at 22.
78. Id. at 833–34, 758 N.W.2d at 18.
79. Id. at 834, 758 N.W.2d at 18.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 834–35, 758 N.W.2d at 19.
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The court then concluded that the newborn screening statutes
were neutral laws of general applicability because there was no evi-
dence that the state enforced them for the purpose of restricting relig-
ious practices, and they did not contain a system of particularized
exemptions.83  The court then held that the state had a rational basis
for the law, namely, to further the state’s legitimate interest in pro-
tecting children’s health and welfare.84
The Nebraska Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the new-
born screening statutes do not violate Section Four of the Nebraska
Constitution because they are neutral and generally applicable, and
the state’s enforcement is rationally related to its interest in protect-
ing children’s health and welfare.85
III. ANALYSIS
Anaya II presented the Nebraska Supreme Court with an opportu-
nity to reaffirm a strong commitment to religious freedom by continu-
ing to apply the compelling interest test to state free exercise claims,
the contrary holding in Smith notwithstanding.  The court missed this
opportunity, deciding instead to follow Smith in applying the rational
basis test to free exercise claims arising out of neutral, generally ap-
plicable laws.  By doing so, the Nebraska Supreme Court left Nebras-
kans without meaningful constitutional protection for free exercise of
religion.
A. By Allowing the U.S. Supreme Court to Determine the
Meaning of Nebraska’s Free Exercise Provision, the
Nebraska Supreme Court Has Disenfranchised
the People of Nebraska
The Nebraska Constitution belongs to the people of Nebraska.
Nebraskans created it in order to form and limit their government.  To
preserve this sovereignty, the Constitution can only be amended with
the approval of three-fifths of the legislature and the majority of vot-
ers in the next election.86  Thus, the Constitution, the state’s most
fundamental law, is not easily changed.  Despite this, by tying the
meaning of Nebraska’s free exercise provision to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s interpretations of the Federal Free Exercise Clause, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court effectively allowed the U.S. Supreme Court to
83. Id. at 835, 758 N.W.2d at 19 (citing Douglas County v. Anaya (Anaya I), 269 Neb.
552, 560, 694 N.W.2d 601, 608 (2005)).
84. Id. at 835–36, 758 N.W.2d at 20 (citing Anaya I, 269 Neb. 552, 694 N.W.2d 601).
85. Id. at 836, 758 N.W.2d at 20.
86. NEB. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 1–2.
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amend the meaning of the Nebraska Constitution without the people’s
consent.87
Rather than following the federal standard, the Nebraska Supreme
Court should have independently analyzed the text, history, and pol-
icy behind Section Four.  Independent interpretation allows state
courts to become more familiar with the state’s constitutional history
and prevents them from overlooking important textual differences be-
tween state and federal provisions.88
In Anaya II, the Nebraska Supreme Court refused to assign any
importance to the textual and historical differences between the state
and federal free exercise provisions.89  This was a mistake for several
reasons.  First, the court has stated that a constitutional provision’s
historical background and intended purpose are relevant to its inter-
pretation.90  When the Nebraska Constitution was first adopted in
1875, the Nebraska provision was the only limitation on the state’s
ability to interfere with the free exercise of religion because the First
Amendment did not apply to state action prior to 1940.91  The framers
of the Nebraska Constitution likely did not intend to tie Section Four’s
meaning to that of a federal amendment that did not then apply to
state action.  Further, the Nebraska framers were well-aware of the
87. It is true that the Nebraska Supreme Court has also tied the meaning of other
state constitutional provisions to similarly worded federal provisions. Anaya II,
276 Neb. at 834, 758 N.W.2d at 19.  However, as Daniel A. Crane notes:
[Tying a state constitutional provision to its federal equivalent] is based
on the assumption that the federal jurisprudence will continue to de-
velop in an interstitial manner similar to accretion of the common
law. . . .
When the [United States] Supreme Court abruptly and radically
breaks with the very constitutional tradition to which the states had tied
their own religious liberty jurisprudence, stare decisis would not seem to
require adherence to the new federal standard under the state constitu-
tion.  Rather, the presumption should be that the state courts will con-
tinue to follow the old standard, which they originally approved in
adopting the federal standard.
Crane, supra note 36, at 248.
88. Rachel A. Van Cleave, State Constitutional Interpretation and Methodology, 28
N.M. L. REV. 199, 203–04 (1998); see also Crane, supra note 36, at 264 (“Many of
the state provisions contain additional twists and turns that could provide courts
with additional textual reasons to grant free exercise exemptions.”).
89. 276 Neb. at 834, 758 N.W.2d at 19.
90. State ex rel. Lemon v. Gale, 272 Neb. 295, 304, 721 N.W.2d 347, 355–56 (2006);
see also 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 56 (2005) (“Constitutional provisions must
be construed in context, meaning that a provision’s history and purpose must be
considered in determining its meaning.”).
91. The U.S. Supreme Court first applied the First Amendment to state action
through the Fourteenth Amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940). See also Patrick, supra note 62, at 335 (noting that the Nebraska Su-
preme Court has consistently held that rights guaranteed in the Nebraska Con-
stitution are no broader than those guaranteed in the United States
Constitution).
\\server05\productn\N\NEB\89-1\NEB104.txt unknown Seq: 14 16-AUG-10 10:26
172 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:159
Federal First Amendment.  The fact that they used different language
indicates an intention to give Section Four a different meaning than
the First Amendment.
In addition, “[i]t is a fundamental principle of constitutional inter-
pretation that each and every clause within a constitution has been
inserted for a useful purpose.”92  Because every clause of the Ne-
braska Constitution has a useful purpose, the court must indepen-
dently analyze the text of Section Four in order to determine this
useful purpose.  Failing to do so ignores Section’s Four’s unique text
and history.  Section Four’s text does not distinguish between laws
aimed at restricting religion and neutral, generally applicable laws
that burden religious practice only incidentally.93  Rather, it prohibits
“any interference with the rights of conscience.”94  A statement by one
of the delegates to the first Nebraska Constitutional Convention in
1871 supports this literal reading of the text:
They require a place wherein they may build their idols, wherein they may
worship.  I believe it is right because it is in obedience to the fundamental
idea, that no man shall be interfered with in the enjoyment of his religion. He
shall worship howsoever, whethersoever, [sic] and whensoever [sic] he may.95
This statement suggests that the framers intended Section Four to
prevent the state from interfering with religious practice without re-
gard to its motive for doing so.
In addition, Nebraska’s prohibition of “any interference with the
rights of conscience”96 is stronger language than that of the First
Amendment, which only says that the government cannot prohibit
free exercise.97  Similarly, Minnesota’s free exercise provision also
prohibits “any interference with the rights of conscience” and says
that an individual’s right to worship freely shall not be “infringed.”98
Accordingly, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held,
Whereas the first amendment establishes a limit on government action at the
point of prohibiting the exercise of religion, section 16 precludes even an in-
fringement on or an interference with religious freedom.  Accordingly, govern-
92. Lemon, 272 Neb. at 304, 721 N.W.2d at 356 (2006) (citing Day v. Nelson, 240 Neb.
997, 485 N.W.2d 583 (1992)) (holding that the requirement under NEB. CONST.
art. III, § 2 that a ballot initiative not be the same “either in form or essential
substance” as another measure submitted to the voters within the preceding
three years requires a broader conceptual analysis than the “same or substan-
tially the same” provision in the New Jersey Constitution) (emphasis added).
93. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4.
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. Experience Estabrook, Member of the Nebraska Constitutional Convention of
1871, Remarks during Debate over the Nebraska Bill of Rights (June 29, 1871) in
OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE NEBRASKA CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONVENTION ASSEMBLED IN LINCOLN, JUNE 13, 1871, at 214 (Addison E.
Sheldon ed., 1905).
96. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4 (emphasis added).
97. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
98. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16.
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ment actions that may not constitute an outright prohibition on religious
practices (thus not violating the first amendment [sic]) could nonetheless in-
fringe on or interfere with those practices, violating the Minnesota
Constitution.99
This language supported the court’s holding that the Minnesota Con-
stitution requires a stronger degree of protection of free exercise, and,
despite Smith, it nonetheless necessitates applying the compelling in-
terest test to a neutral, generally applicable law burdening relig-
ion.100  Because Nebraska’s Section Four, like the Minnesota
provision, contains stronger language than that of the First Amend-
ment, it too suggests that stronger protection is required.
B. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Invalidation of RFRA Should
Not Affect Nebraska’s Standard
The Nebraska Supreme Court adopted the compelling interest test
for claims under Section Four in Palmer.101  In so doing, the court
cited to both LeDoux—and through it, to Sherbert—and RFRA.102
The court stated in Anaya II that because it mentioned RFRA in
Palmer, the U.S. Supreme Court’s later voiding of the statute makes
Palmer’s adoption of the compelling interest test irrelevant.103
However, Palmer’s adoption of the compelling interest test did not
depend on RFRA, so the U.S. Supreme Court’s later invalidation of
RFRA should not affect Palmer’s precedential value.  First, RFRA only
required the compelling interest test for First Amendment claims.  It
did not prevent state courts from interpreting their state constitutions
as providing less protection than the Federal Constitution.104  Rather,
it made a less-protective state free exercise provision irrelevant be-
cause even if a plaintiff lost on the state claim, he or she would still
win on the federal free exercise claim.105  Therefore, when the Ne-
braska Supreme Court decided Palmer, it was free to interpret Ne-
braska’s standard as providing less protection than under the
99. State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1990).
100. Id. at 398.
101. Palmer v. Palmer, 249 Neb. 814, 818, 545 N.W.2d 751, 755 (1996), overruled by In
re Interest of Anaya (Anaya II), 276 Neb. 825, 758 N.W.2d 10 (2008).  The fact
that the court applied the compelling interest test and concluded that the restric-
tions violated both the First Amendment and Section Four, without separately
discussing the two, indicates that the court meant to adopt the compelling inter-
est test for Section Four claims.  Patrick, supra note 62, at 374.  Indeed, the court
noted in Anaya II that the compelling interest test was the proper standard for
Section Four claims when Palmer was decided. Anaya II, 276 Neb. at 833, 758
N.W.2d at 18.
102. Palmer, 249 Neb. at 818, 545 N.W.2d at 755, overruled by Anaya II, 276 Neb. 825,
758 N.W.2d 10 (2008).
103. Anaya II, 276 Neb. at 834, 758 N.W.2d at 18.
104. McCabe, supra note 63, at 50, 62.
105. Id.
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compelling interest test.  The fact that the court adopted the compel-
ling interest test anyway indicates that Section Four independently
requires it.
Palmer’s citation to LeDoux,106 which the Palmer decision noted
was based on the old federal compelling interest standard announced
in Sherbert,107 further supports the conclusion that Palmer’s adoption
of the compelling interest standard did not depend on RFRA.  By the
time of Palmer, the U.S. Supreme Court already had declared that
Sherbert applied only to the narrow case of unemployment benefits.108
In citing to Sherbert via LeDoux in a case unrelated to unemployment
benefits, the Nebraska Supreme Court rejected the Supreme Court’s
narrowing of the Sherbert rule.109  In doing so, it created an indepen-
dent compelling interest standard for state free exercise claims.  This
supports the conclusion that Palmer cited to RFRA only as another
example of the compelling interest test and in order to provide further
support for its holding.  RFRA was not, however, determinative in
that case.  Finally, the fact that Palmer cites to RFRA with the signal
“See, also”110 further supports this conclusion.111
Because Palmer did not depend on RFRA, the fact that U.S. Su-
preme Court later declared RFRA void in City of Boerne should not
have affected Section Four’s meaning. Palmer established the compel-
ling interest test as the standard for Section Four claims, independent
of any federal requirement.  Although Palmer did not concern a neu-
tral, generally applicable law,112 nothing in the text or history of Sec-
tion Four supports having a lower standard for neutral, generally
applicable laws that burden religious practice.
106. LeDoux v. LeDoux, 234 Neb. 479, 485, 452 N.W.2d 1, 5 (1990).
107. Palmer, 249 Neb. at 818, 545 N.W.2d at 755, overruled by Anaya II, 276 Neb. 825,
758 N.W.2d 10 (2008).
108. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882–84 (1990).
109. In citing Sherbert and applying the compelling interest test to a case which the
United States Supreme Court held was outside of Sherbert’s scope, the Nebraska
Supreme Court indicated that it was simply not following the United States Su-
preme Court’s lead.  Rather emphatically, this indicated the Nebraska Supreme
Court’s intention to break with the United States Supreme Court on free exercise
and establish an independent, compelling interest for Nebraska’s free exercise
program.
110. 249 Neb. at 818, 545 N.W.2d at 755, overruled by Anaya II, 276 Neb. 825, 758
N.W.2d 10 (2008).
111. The Bluebook simply states, “ ‘See also’ is commonly used to cite an authority sup-
porting a proposition when authorities that state or directly support the proposi-
tion already have been cited or discussed.” THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM
OF CITATION R. 1.2(a), at 46 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 18th ed.
2005).
112. Rather, Palmer involved a divorce decree that restricted the custodial mother’s
ability to include her child in religious activities.  249 Neb. at 816, 545 N.W.2d at
754, overruled by Anaya II, 276 Neb. 825, 758 N.W.2d 10 (2008).
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C. The Use of the Rational Basis Test Robs Section Four of
Any Real Power to Protect Free Exercise
Not only do Nebraska constitutional history and precedent require
an independent, compelling interest standard for Section Four claims,
Anaya II’s adoption of the rational basis standard robs Section Four of
any real power.  It creates the potential for conflict between an indi-
vidual’s religious obligations and his or her obligations to civil society.
This is the very sort of conflict that free exercise provisions were in-
tended to prevent.113  In addition, under the rational basis standard,
members of minority religions are at the majority’s mercy because
their religious liberty is subject to the political process.114  Courts are
powerless to exempt individuals from neutral, generally applicable
laws, even though the burden on the individual’s religious practice
may be severe, and even though the government may have no impor-
tant reason for burdening religion in the first place.115
Constitutional protection of free exercise is based on the belief that
a person’s religious obligations are beyond the scope of the state’s
power.116  James Madison, one of the framers of the Federal Free Ex-
ercise Clause, stated that a person’s religious duty “is precedent both
in order of time and degree of obligation, to the Claims of Civil Soci-
ety.”117  Free exercise provisions are intended to prevent a forced
choice between obedience to religious duties and obedience to civil
laws.118  Throughout history, religious minorities without such protec-
tion have been forced to move to more tolerant places.  Indeed, such
“forced migration of minorities was an evil that lay at the heart of the
[federal] religion clauses.”119
Because of concern about individuals’ religious freedom, the draft-
ers of the Nebraska Constitution intended to protect it with Section
Four.  Section Four’s literal text provides an absolute, substantive
113. Laycock, supra note 36, at 30.
114. See, e.g., id. at 15.
115. Id. at 38.
116. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
115, 173 (1992).
117. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESS-
MENTS (1785), reprinted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ. 330 U.S. 1, 64 (1947).  A per-
son who faces conflicting demands of religion and civil society is like a soldier has
been told to charge by the General and to retreat by the Captain.  The soldier is
under the authority of two officers.  When ordered to do inconsistent things, he
follows the order of the higher-ranking officer—the General—and charges.
Email from Richard F. Duncan, Professor, University of Nebraska College of
Law, to Sara Lunsford Kohen (Aug. 3, 2009, 10:54:14 CDT) (on file with author).
118. Laycock, supra note 36, at 30.
119. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 n.9 (1972). Yoder discusses the federal
religion provisions, but there is no reason to think that this applies any less to
the Nebraska free exercise provision, given that the Nebraska framers were well
aware of the Federal Bill of Rights.
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right for believers to be left alone by the government.120  Though an
absolute right of free exercise would be unworkable, the compelling
interest test provided a suitable balance, such that only the most im-
portant governmental interests could justify limiting religious free-
dom.  The rational basis test, on the other hand, leaves religious
freedom largely unprotected.  Under rational basis scrutiny, judges
cannot exempt a plaintiff from a law that is neutral, generally applica-
ble, and rationally related to a legitimate government interest, even if
the burden on the individual’s religious practice is extreme121 and the
government has no particularly compelling need for imposing the
burden.122
Indeed, using the rational basis standard changes the essential
character of the rights protected under Section Four. Anaya II
changes Section Four from a “liberty rule” (protecting religious lib-
erty) to an “equality rule” (treating equally both religious and non-
religious acts).123  However, the text of Section Four indicates that it
should be a liberty rule.  Section Four does not say that the state must
guarantee believers equal protection under the law; rather, it says the
state may not interfere with the rights of conscience.124
Equal treatment of religious and secular conduct, moreover, does
not actually guarantee any religious liberty.  Even though believers
might be treated equally under the new rule, they may still be forced
to choose between following their religion and following the law—the
very sort of choice that a free exercise provision is intended to pre-
vent.125  Neutral, generally applicable laws can burden free exercise
just as much as laws that are directed at restricting religious prac-
tice,126 as almost any burden on religion can be couched in neutral
terms.127  For example, Nebraska could pass a law prohibiting all al-
coholic beverages, without any exceptions, for the purpose of prevent-
ing the harmful health effects of drinking.  This would severely
120. See NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4.
121. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); In re Inter-
est of Anaya (Anaya II), 276 Neb. 825, 758 N.W.2d 10 (2008); Carol M. Kaplan,
The Devil is in the Details: Neutral, Generally Applicable Laws and Exceptions
from Smith. 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1045, 1055 (2000).
122. Laycock, supra note 36, at 38.
123. For a discussion of this concept with regard to the Federal Free Exercise Clause,
see Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise is Dead: Long Live Free Exercise: Smith,
Lukumi and the General Applicability Requirement. 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850,
880–81 (2001); Laycock, supra note 36, at 10, 13; McConnell, supra note 36, at
1137.
124. Cf. Laycock, supra note 36, at 13 (discussing the Federal First Amendment).
125. Id. at 30.
126. Smith, 494 U.S. at 901 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Religious Freedom and Resto-
ration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, invalidated by City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
127. Laycock, supra note 36, at 42.
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burden religious groups that use wine in sacraments, such as commu-
nion.  The law would stand, regardless of this burden, because it has a
neutral purpose and, since it contains no exceptions, is generally ap-
plicable.128  Further, not only can neutral, generally applicable laws
burden religious freedom under the rational basis test, the state is
more likely to pass such a law than it is to directly target a religious
practice.129
In addition, applying the rational basis test to neutral, generally
applicable laws means that the political branches of government de-
termine the scope of the right to free exercise.130  However, “[t]he very
purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be
applied by the courts.”131  It is dangerous to allow the legislature
alone to determine whether or not to allow certain religious practices
because legislators are likely to act on majority prejudices, ignore re-
strictions on unpopular groups’ free exercise, and are not required to
make principled decisions.132  It is better to enable judges to alleviate
unnecessarily severe burdens on religious exercise because judges, at
least, are sworn to make decisions based on legal principles, rather
than popular prejudice.133
Because free exercise is now left largely to the political branches of
government, religious minorities stand to lose the most under Anaya
II.  Legislatures may favor majority religions by not passing laws that
burden the practices of majority religious groups,134 but religious mi-
norities often lack the political power necessary to protect their inter-
ests.135  Under the compelling interest standard, courts allowed
128. Duncan, supra note 123, at 859–60.
129. Smith, 494 U.S. at 894 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Justice O’Connor reasons:
[F]ew states would be so naive as to enact a law directly prohibiting or
burdening a religious practice as such.  Our free exercise cases have all
concerned generally applicable laws that had the effect of significantly
burdening a religious practice.  If the First Amendment is to have any
vitality, it ought not be construed to cover only the extreme and hypo-
thetical situation in which a State directly targets a religious practice.
Id.
130. Kaplan, supra note 121, at 1055.
131. Smith, 494 U.S. at 903 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
132. Laycock, supra note 36, at 15; McConnell, supra note 36, at 1136.
133. Laycock, supra note 36, at 15; McConnell, supra note 36, at 1136.
134. McConnell, supra note 32, at 1132.  Also, laws that do burden majority religious
practices will likely be corrected. Id. at 1136.
135. Gregory D. Wellons, Note, Employment Division, Department of Human Re-
sources v. Smith: The Melting of Sherbert Means a Chilling Effect on Religion, 26
U.S.F. L. REV. 149, 172 (1992); see also Laycock, supra note 36, at 15
(“[L]egislators are even more likely to favor familiar faiths with enough adher-
ents to matter at the polls.”).
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religious minorities to bring attention to burdens on their free exercise
rights and obtain “the same sort of hearing that more prominent reli-
gions already receive from the political process.”136  Under Anaya II,
however, Nebraska courts are now powerless to remedy unjust bur-
dens that neutral, generally applicable laws impose on minority relig-
ious practice.
These negative effects of the rule articulated in Smith and Anaya
II reach far beyond the facts of those cases.137  For example, State v.
Miller138 concerned Amish plaintiffs who faced a conflict between a
law that required all slow-moving vehicles to display an orange slow-
moving vehicle sign and a religious belief that required them to ab-
stain from displaying secular symbols on their buggies.139  The Wis-
consin Supreme Court, in construing the Wisconsin free exercise
provision, applied the compelling interest test.140  It noted that under
the rational basis test, the plaintiffs would have been forced to move
out of state to avoid a law that their consciences would not allow them
to obey, even though they demonstrated alternative methods of fur-
thering the government’s interest in preventing accidents, such as the
use of reflective tape.141  If the plaintiffs in Miller lived in Nebraska
today, they would be forced to either violate their beliefs or move to a
state that better protects its inhabitants’ religious freedom.
In sum, by implementing the rational basis standard, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court stripped Section Four of its power.  Section
Four no longer exempts individuals from forced choices between relig-
ious and civil obligations.  The decision allows the majority to deter-
mine the amount of religious freedom enjoyed by minorities by
subjecting it to the political process.  Also, the state is now free to se-
verely burden individuals’ religious practices, even when it has no real
need to do so, so long as the burdensome laws are neutral and gener-
ally applicable.142
D. Concerns about the Compelling Interest Test Are
Unfounded
Some critics, including Justice Scalia, fear that in a pluralistic soci-
ety using the compelling interest standard for neutral, generally ap-
plicable laws that burden religious practices would allow each objector
136. McConnell, supra note 36, at 1136.
137. Arguably, Anaya’s claim still might fail under a compelling interest test because
of the danger to the child.  Such a discussion is beyond the scope of this Note,
however.
138. 549 N.W.2d 235 (Wis. 1996).
139. Id. at 237.
140. Id. at 239–40.
141. Id. at 241–42.
142. Laycock, supra note 36, at 38.
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to become “a law unto himself.”143  This concern is mistaken for sev-
eral reasons.  First, although some worry about the cost of requiring
the government to prove that a law is narrowly tailored to advance a
compelling interest, the greater cost is actually born by religious mi-
norities.  The burden imposed by governmental prohibitions against
certain religious practices falls directly upon religious minorities and
is much greater than any burden on the government caused by re-
quests for religious exemptions.144  The compelling interest test may
indeed result in the state having to expend more resources.  However,
this pales in comparison to the burden imposed on an individual
forced to choose between obeying a religious duty and a secular law.
Those who find this choice impossible must move to more tolerant
places, leaving behind their homes and jobs.
In addition, in a society that values individual rights so greatly
that they are enshrined in the Constitution itself, the concern that
these rights might lead to much litigation does not justify judicially
eviscerating them, which is the result under the standard announced
in Smith and Anaya II.145  It is for this reason that even known
criminals are allowed to go free when their Due Process rights have
been violated.  If fundamental, constitutional rights are important—
and few would deny that they are—then they must be protected, even
if their protection produces some unpleasant consequences.
Also, the compelling interest test does not allow people to “become
a law unto” themselves, as Scalia feared.146  Rather, it allows the gov-
ernment to enforce even an extremely burdensome law if its need to do
so is great enough.  Even before Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court rarely
held in favor of burdened individuals,147 either because it found that
there was no burden,148 the government’s interest was compelling,149
or the claims arose in special, tightly controlled governmental institu-
143. See Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990)
(quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879)).
144. Laycock, supra note 36, at 68.
145. See supra section III.C; see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963) (“[I]t
is highly doubtful whether [evidence of spurious claims] would be sufficient to
warrant a substantial infringement of religious liberties.”).
146. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167
(1879)).
147. Duncan, supra note 123, at 852; McConnell, supra note 36, at 1110.
148. See Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303–05 (1985)
(holding that a law that requires bookkeeping and payment of minimum wage
does burden the free exercise of religious “businesses” that pay workers in bene-
fits rather than cash).
149. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding that the gov-
ernment has a compelling interest in eliminating racial discrimination in
education).
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tions like the military150 and prisons.151  The Nebraska Supreme
Court is also capable of balancing competing individual and govern-
mental claims under the compelling interest test.  In fact, it is likely in
a better position to perform this balancing than a federal court be-
cause “state courts may be more in tune with the state law develop-
ments than the federal courts.”152
Courts are fully able to conduct the analysis required by the com-
pelling interest standard.  First, proving a compelling government in-
terest presents no unusual problems, as determining whether a
compelling interest exists is a part of many constitutional law tests.153
Additionally, courts are often capable of determining whether a relig-
ious practice is burdened.  For example, the U.S. Supreme Court held
in Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor154 that a
law mandating a minimum wage did not burden the free exercise
rights of workers at a religious “business” whose faith prohibited them
from accepting cash payment. The Court held that the workers were
not burdened because the law did not require cash payment (they
could continue to accept payment in benefits), and even if the law did
require payment in cash, the workers could refuse the cash if ac-
cepting it went against their religious beliefs.155  Admittedly, there
are some situations in which courts may not be able to judge exactly
what counts as a burden without drawing their own conclusions as to
the requirements of an individual’s faith.  However, the harm caused
by burdening a religious practice is so great that, in borderline cases,
a court could easily resolve to err in favor of finding a burden.
Though some might worry that people will pretend to hold beliefs
in order to gain a personal benefit, this concern does not justify doing
away with the compelling interest test.  First, allowing exemptions
through the use of the compelling interest test is unlikely to encourage
people to adopt a given religion just to circumvent the law because
many religious practices impose extra burdens on adherents that are
meaningless to non-believers.156  More importantly, the alternative to
150. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (holding that the Air Force did
not have to allow a Jewish officer to wear a yarmulke).
151. See O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (holding that prison officials
do not have to accommodate Muslim prisoners’ requests for schedule changes to
attend prayer services).
152. Crane, supra note 36, at 265.
153. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (applying the
compelling interest test to political speech under the First Amendment); Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (applying the compelling interest test to law
school admissions under the Equal Protection Clause); Chavez v. Martinez, 538
U.S. 760 (2003) (explaining the role of the compelling interest test under the Due
Process Clause).
154. 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
155. Id. at 303–05.
156. Laycock, supra note 36, at 17.
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the compelling interest test, the rational basis test, allows the govern-
ment to burden sincere religious practice without any truly important
need to do so.  Though some individuals undoubtedly will feign a relig-
ious belief in order to reap a personal gain under the compelling inter-
est test, the vital importance of protecting sincere religious practice
requires that society bear the actions of a few insincere individuals.157
Finally, the majority in Smith made much of its rejection of the
idea that courts could stem the flood of potential litigation by protect-
ing only “central” religious practices.158  This is puzzling, however, be-
cause not only is the compelling interest test not limited to central
religious practices, but an analysis of centrality is not even practically
necessary.  Though it is true that a court cannot evaluate how central
a particular practice is to an individual’s personal faith, the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s compelling interest test never required that a particu-
lar religious practice be central.159  Rather, the compelling interest
test requires analyzing sincerity, burden, and compelling governmen-
tal interest.160  The majority in Smith cites to Justice Brennan’s dis-
sent in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n161 as an
example of such a centrality requirement.162  However, the majority
in Lyng explicitly rejected the use of a centrality requirement.163  Not
only does the compelling interest test not require a centrality analysis,
the question of centrality is unnecessary if a belief is sincere.  If a per-
son sincerely believes that his or her religion requires a certain course
of conduct, then a law to the contrary will create the sort of impossible
choice that the framers sought to avoid.
Fears that the compelling interest test will lead to a flood of litiga-
tion or force courts to determine the centrality of a particular practice
to an individual’s faith are unfounded.  In addition, concerns about
analyzing the centrality of a religious practice are misplaced because
such analysis is neither a part of the compelling interest test nor nec-
essary for its proper application.  Because these concerns are ground-
less, and because the compelling interest test provides a superior
balance between individual rights and the state’s need to enforce
157. See supra section III.C. for further discussion of the importance of ensuring free
exercise.
158. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886–87 (1990).
159. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963).
160. Smith, 494 U.S. at 899, 906–07 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see Yoder, 406 U.S. at
214; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402; Palmer v. Palmer, 249 Neb. 814, 817–18, 545
N.W.2d 751, 755 (1996), overruled by In re Interest of Anaya (Anaya II), 276 Neb.
825, 758 N.W.2d 10 (2008); see also Laycock, supra note 36, at 32 (noting that the
problem of evaluating centrality is a “manufactured difficulty.”).
161. 485 U.S. 439, 473–74 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
162. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886.
163. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 457–58.
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many neutral, generally applicable laws, the court was wrong to reject
it.
IV. CONCLUSION
Anaya II gives away Nebraskans’ power over their own constitu-
tional provision and places religious minorities in a precarious posi-
tion that is contrary to the very purpose of a free exercise provision.
By tying the meaning of Nebraska’s Section Four to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s interpretations of the First Amendment, the Nebraska Su-
preme Court has effectively allowed the U.S. Supreme Court to amend
the Nebraska Constitution without the people’s consent.  This is con-
trary to both the text and the history of the Nebraska Constitution.  In
addition, the Nebraska Supreme Court has robbed Section Four of its
power by implementing the rational basis test.  Neutral, generally ap-
plicable laws now can impose extreme burdens on religious freedom,
even if the state has no compelling need to do so.  Individuals are no
longer exempt from forced choices between their religious obligations
and their civic duties.  Finally, the decision allows the majority to de-
termine the amount of religious freedom enjoyed by religious minori-
ties by subjecting religious freedom to the political process.
The harm done by Anaya II can, however, be corrected by legisla-
tively reestablishing the compelling interest standard.  The compel-
ling interest standard protects essential religious liberties to a much
greater extent than the current Anaya II standard and does so with-
out significantly impairing judicial efficiency.  Therefore, in order to
safeguard the rights of Nebraskans, the Unicameral Legislature
should follow the lead of other states164 and pass its own state Relig-
ious Freedom Restoration Act.  Such an act of legislative courage
would reestablish the compelling interest test for all free exercise
claims under Section Four, even when religious freedom is burdened
by a neutral law of general applicability.165  Short of the Nebraska
164. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.01; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571b (2009); FLA. STAT.
§§ 761.01 to 761.05 (2008); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/1 to 35/99 (2008); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 51, §§ 251 to 258 (2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-80.1-1 to 42-80.1-4 (2006). For
further discussion of state RFRAs, see supra note 67.
165. Such a statute could be modeled on Connecticut General Statute section 52-571b,
which reads:
(a) The state or any political subdivision of the state shall not burden a
person’s exercise of religion under section 3 of article first of the constitu-
tion of the state even if the burden results from a rule of general applica-
bility, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) The state or any political subdivision of the state may burden a per-
son’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the
burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest, and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compel-
ling governmental interest.
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Supreme Court overruling Anaya II, such a statute is the only means
of remedying the damage done by Anaya II.
(c) A person whose exercise of religion has been burdened in violation of
the provisions of this section may assert that violation as a claim or de-
fense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against the
state or any political subdivision of the state.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize the state or
any political subdivision of the state to burden any religious belief.
(e) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect, interpret or in
any way address that portion of article seventh of the constitution of the
state that prohibits any law giving a preference to any religious society
or denomination in the state. The granting of government funding, bene-
fits or exemptions, to the extent permissible under the constitution of
the state, shall not constitute a violation of this section. As used in this
subsection, the term “granting” does not include the denial of govern-
ment funding, benefits or exemptions.
(f) For the purposes of this section, “state or any political subdivision of
the state” includes any agency, board, commission, department, officer
or employee of the state or any political subdivision of the state, and
“demonstrates” means meets the burdens of going forward with the evi-
dence and of persuasion.”
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571b (2009).
